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Opinion TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.10 No.10Recent imaging results suggest that individuals
automatically share the emotions of others when
exposed to their emotions. We question the assumption
of the automaticity and propose a contextual approach,
suggesting several modulatory factors that might influ-
ence empathic brain responses. Contextual appraisal
could occur early in emotional cue evaluation, which
then might or might not lead to an empathic brain
response, or not until after an empathic brain response
is automatically elicited. We propose two major roles
for empathy; its epistemological role is to provide
information about the future actions of other people,
and important environmental properties. Its social role is
to serve as the origin of the motivation for cooperative
and prosocial behavior, aswell as help for effective social
communication.
Introduction
Ten years after the discovery of mirror neurons inmonkeys
[1], we now also have evidence for shared affective neuro-
nal networks underlying our ability to empathize. Brain
imaging studies have shown overlapping brain activation
patterns when subjects feel their own emotions and
observe the same emotions in others [2–8]. It has been
suggested that: (i) shared affective neuronal networks
explain how we feel the emotions of others as if they were
our own and (ii) these networks are activated automati-
cally whenever we observe others displaying emotion. But
is empathy really automatically triggered every time we
observe someone else displaying emotion? Here, with the
combined perspectives of neuroscience, psychology and
philosophy, we question the assumption of automatic
empathy and propose several factors that might modulate
when and to what extent we feel empathy. In addition, we
provide preliminary answers to the question concerning
why empathy might have evolved.
What is empathy and how do we empathize: the shared
network hypothesis
Before suggesting some answers to the how, the when and
the why of empathy, we attempt to shed light on what
empathy means. There are probably nearly as many defi-
nitions of empathy as people working on the topic. There
are two main trends: some argue for a broad definition ofCorresponding author: Singer, T. (singer@iew.unizh.ch).
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affect sharing [9] or as ‘an affective response more appro-
priate to another’s situation than one’s own’ [10]. So
defined, empathy subsumes phenomena such as emotional
contagion, sympathy, personal distress or even cognitive
perspective-taking. However, this definition does not
enable precise claims to be made about the nature of
empathy or its automaticity because one can always reply
that it depends on the level of empathy [11]. Others,
ourselves included, prefer to narrow down the concept of
empathy [12,13]. There is empathy if: (i) one is in an
affective state; (ii) this state is isomorphic to another
person’s affective state; (iii) this state is elicited by the
observation or imagination of another person’s affective
state; (iv) one knows that the other person is the source of
one’s own affective state.
This narrower definition of empathy still leaves some
questions open (Box 1). However, it enables us to distin-
guish empathy from other related phenomena. Cognitive
perspective-taking, for example, does not meet the first
condition. One represents the mental states of others,
including affective states, without being emotionally
involved (e.g. based on my knowledge of you, I infer from
your behavior that you are anxious but I do not feel
anxious). Similar to empathy, sympathy refers to an affec-
tive state related to the other and is therefore often taken
as being synonymous [13]. However, it does not meet the
condition of isomorphism (e.g. I feel sorry for you because
you feel jealous, depressed or angry but I am not jealous or
depressed myself). Finally, emotional contagion involves
affect sharing but does not meet the condition of self–other
distinction (e.g. the baby starts crying because other babies
cry but the baby is not necessarily aware that the other is
the source of their affective state).
The narrow definition of empathy proposed above was
partially motivated by the investigation of the neuronal
basis of empathy. Recent functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) studies have shown that observing another
person’s emotional state activates parts of the neuronal
network involved in processing that same state in oneself,
whether it is disgust [2], touch [3] or pain [4–8] (Figure 1).
Some authors have suggested that shared circuits such
as these are formed by associative learning or Hebbian
learning mechanisms in the domains of actions [14,15],
emotions and sensations [15]. In the view of these authors,
shared networks might result from associations between
simultaneously firing, coactivated neurons. Hence,d. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.08.008
Box 1. Open questions about empathy: consciousness and
isomorphism
Controversy exists as to whether empathic responses are necessa-
rily conscious. Some philosophers argue that empathy is a
conscious experience of what it is like to feel what the other feels
through ‘online simulation’ [43,44]. By contrast, neuroscientists
promote the view that affective states are automatically and
unconsciously shared with others. Although it is possible to study
empathy independently of this problem, this phenomenological
dimension still remains to be acknowledged.
Another open question concerns the degree to which the
empathic response is isomorphic to the original affective state. Is
it a coarse-grained congruency (e.g. only the same valence) or a
more fine-grained equivalence (e.g. same valence, intensity and
components)? Neuroscience has started to tackle this question but
cannot yet provide an unambiguous answer. Most of the recent
fMRI studies on pain, for example, have suggested that empathic
responses are associated with activity in the affective component of
the pain network (ACC and AI) rather than with its sensorimotor
properties (primary and secondary somatosensory cortices). How-
ever, using transcranial magnetic stimulation, Aglioti’s group
revealed reduced motor excitability specific to the muscle that the
subjects observed being penetrated deeply by needles in another
person [21]. Likewise, a recent study of ‘empathy’ for touch revealed
activation of primary sensorimotor cortex that was somatotopically
mapped [45], contrasting with another study showing only second-
ary somatosensory cortex activity [3]. A challenge for future
research will be to isolate the factors determining the degree of
isomorphism in empathy.
Figure 1. Shared brain networks, as revealed in fMRI studies on empathy for disgust,
disgusting odors (red) and the sight of someone else smelling disgusting odors [2]. (b)
videos showing a leg being touched (blue) [3]. (c–g) Overlapping brain activity in the AI
with another person feeling pain (red), whereby (c) shows the activation of women
involvement of the same network when women (right) or men (left) observe an unkno
brain responses of subjects viewing still images of potentially painful situations [50], fa
details regarding methods and analysis of these studies, see papers cited.
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www.sciencedirect.comwhenever a percept (e.g. the sight of an angry face) or
symbolic cue (e.g. the word ‘pain’) is accompanied by a
certain emotional, visceral or somatosensory activation, a
connection between the cue and the neural representation
of the internal sensation is formed. Later, the mere pre-
sentation of these cues can trigger the emotional, visceral
or sensorimotor representation associated with it. Accord-
ing to this view, empathic responses are automatically
elicited by the mere perception of these cues. But is empa-
thy really always automatic?
When do we empathize: automatism and modulatory
factors
As Figure 1 illustrates, common neural networks involved
in empathy are activated by the perception not only of
loved ones in pain [4], but also of unknown people in pain
[8], or even of a needle penetrating the back of someone’s
hand [6]. Furthermore, subjects have not always been told
the goal of the study [2–4,6,7]. These results suggest that
we always automatically empathize with others when
exposed to their emotions, regardless of who they are. Is
this true? Or are we more selective?
At the phenomenological level, we are obviously not
constantly empathizing with the people around us [16].
In real life, we constantly witness people displaying contra-
dictory emotions. If we were to consciously feel what they
feel all the time, we would be in permanent emotionaltouch and pain. (a) A common brain activation in the AI elicited by the smell of
Common activation in SII associated with being touched on a leg (red) or watching
and ACC when receiving painful stimulation oneself (green) or when empathizing
perceiving cues indicative of their male partners feeling pain [4], (d) depicts the
wn but previously fair player receiving painful stimulation [22] and (e–g) illustrate
cial expressions of pain [8] and needles pricking a human hand [6]. For all further
Box 2. Motor theory of empathy
The notion of empathy has been linked to action ever since it was
introduced. Theodor Lipps suggested that by internally imitating a
facial expression, we have direct access to the emotion that
triggered that facial expression. The discovery of mirror matching
systems in the motor domain is considered as the first neural
evidence of Lipps’ theory: the perception of someone else moving
suffices to elicit a mental simulation of the observed movement and,
if not inhibited, the subsequent physical execution of that move-
ment. Imitation is thus a prepotent automatic response tendency
[14], even if usually inhibited.
One might then suggest that empathy is not so far from imitation.
They both depend on shared representations between self and
other. They are both automatic. They both remain offline if
inhibited. Consequently, several authors propose a ‘motor theory
of empathy’ [46–49] according to which one recognizes others’
emotions by means of action representation and imitation: emo-
tions can be expressed by gestures and/or facial expressions (i.e.
actions), and internally mimicking these actions enables one to
recognize the underlying affective states.
We propose that empathy does not rely exclusively on bodily
movements. Consequently, neuronal networks underlying empathy
do not necessarily activate the usual motor circuitries observed in
action observation and imitation. As Figure 1 illustrates, empathic
responses activate somatosensory cortices as well as limbic and
paralimbic structures such as the ACC and AI instead of action
systems associated with mirror neurons. These findings suggest
that one can rely on the shared emotional network alone,
independently of any activation of the motor network. Although
mirror systems are domain specific [38], action can still be viewed as
a model of understanding [9].
Opinion TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.10 No.10 437turmoil, leaving no room for our own emotions. However,
from a neuroscientific perspective, it could be argued that
we unconsciously share the affects of others even though
we are not aware of doing so. The question of when we
empathize would thus be irrelevant because empathic
brain responses would be automatic and systematic [9].
In this sense, empathy would not differ from emotional
contagion or imitation (Box 2).
We now provide neuroscientific evidence suggesting
that empathy is not merely the consequence of the passive
observation of emotional cues but that it is subject to
contextual appraisal and modulation. Such a view is in
line with several years of behavioral research in the fields
of developmental and social psychology investigating the
role of modulatory factors, such as similarity and famil-
iarity, in empathy, mostly measured indirectly through
indices of prosocial behavior or self- and parental reports
[9,17–20].
Modulation of the empathic brain
Recently, neuroscientists have started investigating
whether activity in shared emotional networks can beTable 1. Modulatory factors of empathy
Features of emotions Relationship between empathizer and
target
Valence Affective link and nurturance
Intensity Self-implication (e.g. jealousy,
anger)
Saliency Familiarity and similarity
Primary versus
secondary emotions
Communicative intentions
www.sciencedirect.commodulated. Evidence for a modulatory role of saliency
and intensity of the pain stimuluswas observed byAglioti’s
group, who only saw an empathy-related reduction in
motor excitability in the observer’s hand when a needle
deeply penetrated the model’s muscle but not when the
needle merely pricked the hand [21].
Singer et al. [22] found modulation as a function of the
affective link between the empathizer and the person in
pain. Male and female volunteers first played repeated
sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma games with two confeder-
ates. One confederate played fairly and the other unfairly.
Empathy-related activation in the anterior cingulate cor-
tex (ACC) and anterior insula (AI) was observed for both
genders when the fair, likeable player was in pain. How-
ever, men, but not women, showed an absence of such
empathic activity when perceiving an unfair player in pain.
Instead, the men showed, on average, an increase in
activity in areas associated with reward (nucleus accum-
bens), which was positively correlated with the expressed
desire for revenge assessed after the study by question-
naires. Finally, Lamm et al. [23] showed that subjects had a
smaller empathic response in pain-related areas when
they knew that the pain inflicted to the other was justified
to cure the other, than when not [23]. In sum, these
findings suggest that empathic brain responses are prone
to modulation.
The contextual approach
Based on these findings, we propose a contextual approach
to empathy. We propose that: (i) empathy is modulated by
appraisal processes and (ii) thismodulation is present even
at the subpersonal level of a neural empathic response, and
can be fast and implicit.
First, we distinguish between two types ofmodulation of
empathy. On the one hand, one can modulate one’s empa-
thy voluntarily, using the control one has over one’s emo-
tional responses [24]. For example, medical practitioners
or Buddhist monks can acquire high degrees of emotional
control with experience and practice. On the other hand,
empathy can bemodulated by implicit appraisal processes,
which might strongly influence the magnitude of empathic
responses. We now focus on the latter aspect and distin-
guish between four main categories of modulatory factors
(Table 1).
Intrinsic features of the shared emotion
The intensity, saliency and valence (positive versus nega-
tive) of the emotion displayed by the target might have a
great influence on the intensity of the empathizer’s
empathic response. Moreover, it might be easier toSituative context Empathizer
Appraisal of the
situation
Mood arousal
Display of multiple
emotions
Personality, gender and
age
Emotional repertoire
Emotional regulation
capacities
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the early and late appraisal model of empathy.
438 Opinion TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.10 No.10empathize with primary emotions such as fear, happiness
or sadness than with secondary emotions such as jealousy.
Relationship between the empathizer and the target
In the study by Singer et al. [22], the empathic responses
were modulated by the affective link between the empathi-
zer and the person in pain. Other factors, such as similarity
[18], familiarity [19] between the two protagonists, how
much protection or care (e.g. nurturance [20]) the target
needs and whether the emotion is directed towards the
empathizer or not (the person in pain being angry or
jealous about the empathizer) might also be crucial.
Characteristics of the empathizer
The gender [25,26], personality, age [27] and past experi-
ences of the empathizer [28] might be relevant. An
empathizer who does not suffer from vertigo can hardly
empathize with a target who is frightened by the void
below him because he does not have the specific feeling
of vertigo in his repertoire. In such a case, the empathizer
might engage in cognitive perspective-taking rather than
empathizing.
Situative context
Could I share your joy if I knew that it was not justified?
Could I empathize with you if you suddenly started crying
for no apparent reason or would I be more surprised?
Empathizing can also become difficult if the empathizer
is simultaneously confronted with two or more targets if
the targets are expressing different emotions.
Some of the modulatory factors can be partly explained
by the role they have in increasing or decreasing attention
to the emotion-eliciting stimulus (e.g. cue saliency and
intensity; empathizer’smood and level of arousal; empathi-
zer and target’s familiarity with and similarity to each
other; target’s intention to communicate that he wants the
empathizer to share his emotions). However, the modula-
tion of empathy cannot solely be explained by attention. In
the study by Singer et al. [22], for example, men paid as
much attention to fair as to unfair players, as shown by a
similar degree of brain activity at the sight of nonpainful
stimulation of both players. Future research will have to
determine the relative importance of these factors and
investigate their complex interplay inmodulating empathic
brain responses.www.sciencedirect.comWhen does modulation occur?
The next question that arises is, at which stage of empathic
processing does this modulation occur? Do appraisal pro-
cesses take place before the onset of, or during an empathic
response? Figure 2 illustrates the two possible routes.
According to the late appraisal model, the empathic
response is directly and automatically activated by the
perception of an emotional cue. The default rule is that
there is always an empathic response. However, this model
does not prevent the prior empathic response from being
modulated or inhibited at a later stage. Information about
the general and personal context is processed in parallel.
The outcome of the contextual appraisal process leads to
the modulation of the empathic response. This modulation
can either be achieved by top-down inhibitory or excitatory
processes or by horizontal competition between different
motivational processes. For example, in the study by
Singer et al. [22], different motivational systems might
have competed and the men’s desire for revenge might
have won over the inclination to empathize with someone
feeling pain. Thus, in this model, there are two indepen-
dent systems working in parallel, empathic resonance and
appraisal processes.
According to the early appraisal model, the empathic
response is not directly and automatically activated by
the perception of an emotional cue. Rather, the
emotional cue is evaluated in the context of external
and internal information. Whether an empathic response
is elicited depends on the outcome of the contextual
appraisal process. Thus, the default rule is that an
empathic response is not automatically activated but
an empathic response might be elicited as the outcome
of the appraisal process (Jacob and Jeannerod [29] have
a similar view of mirror neurons).
Current neuroscientific studies on empathy cannot yet
distinguish between these two proposed routes. The
results of Singer et al. [4] provide an example of a case
in which contextual processing preceded the activation of
shared networks. Subjects had to decode a symbolic colored
cue indicating whether a painful or nonpainful stimulation
would be delivered to the other person. Only then could
they engage in empathy. In the future, additional studies
should be designed that distinguish between the two
routes proposed above (Box 3). One possibility would be
to use alternative techniques, such as electro- or
Box 3. Questions for future research
 What are the temporal dynamics of empathic brain responses and
their modulation?
 How can neuroscience explain the influence of modulatory factors
on shared emotional networks?
 How do empathy, sympathy, prosocial behavior and cognitive
perspective-taking relate to each other?
 Does brain architecture constrain which shared emotional net-
works can be formed?
 How does the brain differentiate between self and other?
 How does the awareness of empathic responses arise? Is it
associated with a dimensional shift in the brain activation
threshold in the shared brain network or a qualitatively different
pattern of neural activation?
 Is there evidence for a failure in, or disruption of, shared emotion
networks in people with social deficits, such as people with
autistic spectrum disorder and psychopathy?
 Is there evidence for neuronal plasticity in the domain of social
emotions like empathy?
Opinion TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.10 No.10 439magnetoencephalography, which provide a better tem-
poral resolution than fMRI. Moreover, paradigms such
as that used by Singer et al. [22] could be improved by
analyzing the effective connectivity (e.g. by dynamic causal
modeling [30]); this would enable the determination of
whether the decrease in empathy-related activation in
the ACC and AI in men observing unfair as compared with
fair players in pain was causally preceded by an increase in
activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, an area
that has been associated with emotional control and inhi-
bition [31,32].
Why do we empathize: epistemological and social roles
Having discussed when we empathize, we now turn to
the question of why we empathize. What is empathy for?
Here, it is important to distinguish between two ques-
tions: (i) why has evolution selected empathy? and (ii)
what is the role of empathy now that it has emerged? The
former question refers to the adaptive function of empa-
thy, and the answer lies in studies of empathy in other
species [9]. The latter question refers to its functional
role in everyday life, and the answer lies in studies
of disturbances in empathy (e.g. in psychopaths [33]),
and in social and developmental psychological studies
[17].
With regard to the adaptive function of empathy, some
have suggested that empathy was selected by evolution for
mother–child bonding [34] or reciprocal altruism [35].
However, neither of these explanations really target empa-
thy specifically because bonding can depend on emotional
contagion and altruism on cognitive perspective-taking or
sympathy. Moreover, one might argue that empathy does
not have a specific adaptive function. Shared emotional
representations could have evolved as a byproduct of more
general associative learning mechanisms [14,15]. One
might even go a step further and propose that shared
emotional representations might even be maladaptive
and costly. What is the benefit of a mechanism that makes
you feel sad whenever someone else is sad? However, given
the efficiency of Hebbian learning mechanisms for many
other survival functions, it can be argued that the cost
associated with empathic responses might simply have
been ‘tolerated’ by evolution.www.sciencedirect.comWe will refrain here from any speculation concerning
evolution and now focus on the second question by pointing
out twomajor roles of empathy in everyday life, suggesting
that empathy is not maladaptive and costly.
Epistemological role
On the basis of the emotions we share with others, empa-
thy enables us to understand what they feel. However, so
does cognitive perspective-taking. Also, if we endorse the
early appraisal model (Figure 2), empathy might not even
be a faster route. So, why is empathy better? We believe
that empathy has two main advantages.
First, as compared with cognitive perspective-taking, it
might not be the more direct route to understanding other
people’s emotions but it is a faster route for prediction of
their subsequent behavior. We propose that empathy pro-
vides a more precise and direct estimate of other people’s
future actions because shared emotional networks also
directly elicit the activation of associated relevant motiva-
tional and action systems. By sharing the emotional state
of others, we also share their emotional and motivational
significance [36]. However, it should be noted that predic-
tion accuracy depends on the similarity between the
empathizer’s and the target’s experiential repertoires [37].
Second, empathy provides knowledge about important
environmental properties. For instance, by seeing someone
being burnt by a machine, we attach a negative ‘avoidance’
value to the machine, without first having to experience
the pain ourselves [38]. In this sense, empathy is an
efficient computation tool for acquiring knowledge about
the values of the world around us [9].
Social role
The social role of empathy has been emphasized more in
the literature, empathy having been related to moral
sense, altruism, justice, prosocial behavior and cooperation
[10,27,39,40]. Some behavioral evidence indeed suggests
that people help others more when they report having
empathizedwith them, whether they help to alleviate their
own personal distress or because they care for the other
person [27]. However, it remains to be shown whether
individual differences in empathic brain responses also
predict subsequent prosocial behavior.
A further question presents itself: is empathy a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for these prosocial behaviors
to arise?
Individuals with empathy deficits are more likely to
display aggressive, antisocial behavior towards others
[10]. Some have even argued that a lack of empathy during
development results in a lack of morality [33]. Does this
mean that empathy is necessary for prosocial behavior and
morality? Empathy has a strong motivational role but it is
likely that it is not the only possible motivation for coop-
eration and prosocial behavior [41]. Imagine, for example,
a political prisoner under a dictatorship. Someone might
help him to escape, not because he necessarily empathizes
with him but because he opposes the government and has
strong feelings of hate and beliefs about justice that moti-
vate him to help.
If empathy is not a necessary condition, is it a sufficient
condition for inducing prosocial behavior? In line with
440 Opinion TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.10 No.10others [10,27,40], we suggest that empathy per se does not
suffice to induce prosocial behavior but that empathy has
to be turned into sympathy to motivate helping. By con-
trast, empathic responses might also result in personal
distress and thereby motivate self-related behavior, such
as avoidance and withdrawal, instead of other-related
prosocial behavior [40]. Clearly, neuroscientific research
is still in its infancy. As for questions concerning the
interplay between empathy, sympathy and prosocial beha-
vior, we need a better understanding of the neural signa-
ture underlying specific emotions and empathy before we
can distinguish between empathic and sympathetic affec-
tive brain responses.
Finally, we propose that the ability to share other
people’s emotional experiences and to react to them in a
fine-tuned manner might facilitate social communication
and create social coherence. For example, in action imita-
tion, the chameleon effect – the tendency to adopt other
people’s postures, gestures andmannerisms – was found to
create affiliation and fondness [42]. Similarly, perceiving
another person’s empathy for oneself is likely to increase
affiliation and strengthen the emotional bond with that
person. The development of simultaneous recording tech-
niques between multiple brains might be a promising step
for future neuroscientific research in this domain.
Conclusion
Regarding the question of how we share someone else’s
emotions, this occurs by means of shared affective neural
networks, which are activated when we feel our own emo-
tions, as well as when we observe others feeling emotions.
Moving on to the question of when we have an empathic
response, recent findings suggest that empathic brain
responses are modulated by appraisal processes which
take into account information about the emotional stimuli,
their situative context, characteristics of the empathizer
and his/her relationship with the target.With regard to the
question of why we feel empathy, we have proposed two
major roles of empathy: one epistemological and one social.
Empathy might enable us to make faster and more accu-
rate predictions of other people’s needs and actions and
discover salient aspects of our environment. Furthermore,
empathy might serve as the origin of the motivation for
altruistic behavior and cooperation. Finally, it might have
a crucial role in human communication.
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